of unfortunate past experiences, that there is a real distinction between offensive and defensive warfare; and therefore that, as civilisation progresses, it may become no longer "impossible that all armies should be armies of defence" (p. 16). Here, as in so many other departments of life, an organism may well become practically useless many generations before it finally disappears; and we may reasonably calculate our policy with reference to this future possibility, only taking care not to anticipate it with an unscientific impatience which must defeat its own ends. Professor Woods does not disguise his sympathy with what seems logical in militarism, or his contempt for the too frequent false logic of prominent pacifists. But he lays all his cards upon the table; he produces an array of facts which future historians will have to face; and, meanwhile, his present comments on those facts are both readable and stimulating.

G. G. COULTON.

Mosso, A. *Fatigue.* Translated by Margaret Drummond and W. B. Drummond. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.; 1915; price 3s. 6d.; pp. 334.

THE issue of a third and cheaper edition of an English translation of Professor Mosso's well-known work is most opportune. Fatigue as a practical problem has recently been engaging the attention both of business firms and of Government departments. Professor Mosso's book not only describes original scientific investigations of the utmost importance for the understanding of fatigue, but also provides a popular and fascinating exposition of the physiology and psychology of his subject, so far as it was known when he wrote. It would, perhaps, have been well if the translators could have prefaced this last edition by at least a reminder, if not a résumé, of the large additions that have been made to our knowledge of fatigue since first the book was published.

Conway, SIR MARTIN. *The Crowd in Peace and War.* London: Longman's, Green and Co.; 1915; price 6s. net; pp. 332.

WHEN Pickwick was being taken to the house of the magistrate, followed by a shouting crowd, Sam Weller "stepped aside to see the crowd pass, and finding that they were cheering away, very much to their own satisfaction, forthwith began to cheer too, with all his might and main"—being entirely ignorant both of his master's predicament, and, indeed, of the cause of the cheering. Why an individual behaves differently when in a crowd, and why the differences in behaviour are apparently so irrational—these are questions which have often interested social psychologists. In France a definite doctrine of crowd psychology has been developed, and attempts have been made to base the psychology of society upon analogies derived from the study of crowds.

Sir Martin Conway has endeavoured to apply the generalisations of crowd-psychologists to the facts of current social and political life; to illustrate the applications by actual events; and to draw corollaries of practical interest to men of affairs. The discussion is enriched by a wealth of felicitous instances; and the style enlivened by apt and suggestive metaphors. To add to scientific knowledge, either of the crowd or of society, is perhaps scarcely his immediate purpose.

The first chapter deals with "Kinds of crowds." They are taken as ranging from the mob that collects around a street accident up to a modern English Cabinet. The different grades of self-consciousness and organisation that may exist within such "crowds" are perhaps not quite clearly exhibited. "Executive Committees," it is said, "can never in fact be crowds. . . . A crowd cannot take counsel. It can only listen to competing leaders and accept one of them. Where the purpose to be obtained cannot so be arrived at, a crowd is impotent." The following chapter

discusses the "Nature of crowds." "A crowd is not, as most old writers used to assume it to be, either the sum or the average of the individuals composing it, but is wholly different in kind from those individuals—as different as is an animal from the cells of which its body is built up." "The fundamental reason . . . . is because no two individuals can ever think alike, whilst any number can feel alike."

These statements are sound as far as they go. But they fail to recognise two important contributions which have recently been made to the psychology of the crowd. The first is the formulation of the important part played in human activities by the gregarious instinct. The earliest description of its operation we owe to Sir Francis Galton. Recently, in two papers published in the *Sociological Review*, and in a book published last February, Mr. Trotter has brilliantly analysed the nature of the "herd instinct," and its operation in peace and war. It is the gregarious instinct, which, in co-operation with primitive sympathy, leads men to seek to share their emotions with the largest possible number of their fellows: and which, therefore, is ultimately responsible for the formation of crowds. The second factor does not of itself lead to the formation of crowds; but, once the crowd is formed, both unifies it and leads to the development of higher types. This is the consciousness possessed by the crowd of itself as a crowd. It is the higher development of this collective self-consciousness that differentiates a nation from a mob; endows it with a collective reason and a collective will, and has led many a philosopher to attribute to an organised community, not only a body which is more than the sum of its members, but also an over-soul which is more than the sum of the souls of the component individuals. In his preliminary analysis of the nature of crowds and in his enumeration of crowds of different kinds, Sir Martin Conway somewhat neglects these two factors; and the reader of the opening chapters is consequently left with a feeling that only the accidental peculiarities of crowds have been described, and not their essential characteristics.

Succeeding chapters deal severally with the units, the continuity, the instincts, the exponents, the compellers, the representatives, and the organisation of crowds.

The chief instincts of crowds are expansion and self-preservation, and the chapter on "Crowd-instincts" closes with a paragraph of advice to eugenists. "The great impediment to eugenics propaganda" is the instinct of self-preservation. "The public, like any other crowd, instinctively dreads loss of membership, that is to say, the untimely death of its members unless they give their lives for it." An executed murderer, and a weakly infant that untimely dies, does, in fact, give his life for the crowd as completely as a soldier slain in battle. "But no crowd will realise this. . . . Public opinion is not formed by reason but by emotion. Eugenists must quit their laboratories and statistical bureaus, must go forth into the public area, and evoke the passions of men on their side before they can accomplish any practical result."

The relation of the crowd to liberty, government, education, morals and religion are dealt with successively. The treatment is both interesting and suggestive. But, as Lord Cromer has noted in his discussion of the book, the political standpoint is perhaps a little one-sided. Once more, like those of the traditional crowd-psychology, the doctrines seem biassed by an excessive pre-occupation with the more primitive kinds of "crowds."

The chapter upon "War, Its Cause and Cure," starts with the proposition: "All similar independent crowds are mutually hostile"; for, "if every crowd desires unlimited expansion, all other similar crowds are interested to prevent the expansion of any one." "The *ultima ratio* of war, therefore, is the existence of national crowds not united by alliance under any kind of over-crowd"; and "if the whole world were united into

a single over-crowd, war would cease as long as that union of crowds lasted."

The book closes with two chapters upon the "value of the crowd" in preserving ideals, and upon the "just mean." The individual must observe the mean between crowd-emotion and individualistic thought. The "crowd" must observe the mean between excessive crowd-power—the danger of Socialism, and excessive individual liberty—the danger of democracy. CYRIL BURT.

Goodsell. WILLYSTINE, PH.D., Assistant Professor of Education, Columbia University. *The Family as a Social and Educational Institution.* The Macmillan Company; price 8s. 6d. net; pp. 588.

THIS is one of the class of books about which it can be said that, making no claim to originality, it at least shows great industry. The author is evidently acquainted with the literature of his subject. His bibliography is impressive; his selection of extracts and quotations—and extracts and quotations constitute a considerable portion of the volume—is extensive and informing.

The plan of the book is to treat the subject of the family from the distribution of types—the primitive and savage; the patriarchal-Hebrew, Greek, Roman and early Christian; the Mediæval; the Renaissance; the Modern. The last section deals with current theories of reform. The chapter on the Family in the American Colonies in the 17th and 18th centuries would probably be picked out by an English writer as containing some fresh information, but, doubtless, students of the social life of New England would not be similarly impressed.

The book seems to fail in critical insight, both as to the value of the different sources of information and as to the interaction of the forces at play that mould civilisation.

In the account of the Hebrew family, it appears to be implied that the so-called Mosaic laws of the Pentateuch can be referred to the patriarchal, nomadic stage of the nation's existence, and there is no careful distinction between the elements of old tribal law and the later priestly codes in which they are enshrined. Then, to say, as on page 164, that "the Church" did not interfere with the betrothal and marriage customs of the Roman Empire during the first three centuries, surely gives an entirely wrong impression. The "Church," or whatever organisation then existed to be called by that name, was hardly in a position to do so. It was only painfully working out the conditions and possibilities of its own corporate existence. Again, to come to more recent times, the sentence on page 415 dealing with the gilds and their effect on family life is hopelessly inadequate. We read that "the gilds had been steadily declining in influence since the 15th century when Parliament had begun to enact legislation governing their organisation and conduct." Such a sentence certainly suggests that the decline of the gilds—which was by no means confined to England—is to be attributed to Parliamentary interference; whereas it was far more certainly due to the changes in the value of currency, the extension of trading facilities and the decay of the religious motive for the organisation of all departments of human activity—social phenomena which marked everywhere the inception of the Renaissance and had nothing to do with the English Parliament and the legislative enactments by which it sought to control the issues at stake.

The book deals with a variety of interesting topics and views, and should serve to awaken interest; but we are inclined to believe that the specialist in each department will see reason to be dissatisfied with the critical treatment of material which bears on his own particular field of inquiry and study. C. D. W.